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s one grows older, birthdays gradually shift from being
celebratory events to more reflective occasions. One's
40th birthday is commemorated rather differently from one's
21st, which is, in turn, celebrated quite differently from one's
first. After a certain point, the individual birthdays become less
important and it is the milestone years to which we pay particular
attention. Sadly for entities like the Securities and Exchange
Commission, it is only the milestone years (the ones ending in five
or zero, for some reason), that draw any attention at all. No one
held a conference to celebrate the SEC's 67th anniversary. Clearly
the SEC is not getting its fair share of chocolate cake.
Eventually the birthdays come to be recognitions of the fact
that you are still around. Survival, not moving ahead in life,
becomes the notable fact. And so it is with the SEC. It has now
been 70 years since Congress created the SEC in the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934. We are still short of the gold standard
for human survival - I 00 years - but 70 is not bad. The SEC
today looks poised to outlast even the longest human life span.
It has largely moved beyond the tasks that dominated much of
its early agenda - the taming of the New York Stock Exchange,
the reform of corporate bankruptcies and public utilities - and
ensconced itself firmly as the arbiter of corporate disclosure and
the primary enforcer of anti-fraud rules relating to the purchase
and sale of securities. And the perceived importance of those
latter-day functions, and thus, the SEC's prospects for survival,
have only increased of late, reinforced by the.fin de side accounting
scandals and corporate abuses. The list is by now familiar
- Enron, WorldCom, Tyco, Adelphia, Global Crossing, etc., etc.
- and that drumbeat of scandal has made the SEC once again the
fair-haired boy of the Congress and the White House. The SEC
was given a raft of new enforcement tools by Congress in the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act as politicians fell over themselves to get tough
on corporate crime in the wake of the collapse of the tech bubble.
The SEC - most anxious not to disappoint - has responded to
this groundswell of support with a flurry of rulemaking aimed

at accountants, analysts and audit committees, just to cover the
"A''s. I have not run across any rules directed toward the "Z"s, but
I am sure that is only because the agency has not gotten that far
yet. So the SEC clearly shows no interest in slowing down and
taking it easy as it reaches its advanced years. A more telling sign
of continued vitality at the SEC is that the customary complaints
about how the agency docs not have nearly enough resources to
adequately do its job of protecting the integrity of our financial
markets have given way to an extraordinary situation in which the
agency finds itself unable to spend all of the money allocated to
it by Congress (which was in turn, more than the White House
asked for). This is a most unusual problem for a bureaucracy to
have. In sum, business is booming at the SEC.
How odd then, the suggestion of my title that it might be time
for the SEC's retirement. Retirement can be made mandatory
for persons in "high policymaking position[s]" after the age of 65,
and the SEC certainly qualifies as a policymaker. But no one is
pushing the SEC toward retirement. Well, almost no one
I am
not the first to suggest that the time has come to put the SEC out
to pasture . Jon Macey suggested 10 years ago at a commemoration of the bureau's 60th anniversary that the SEC had become
"obsolete" and that it was time to kill it off. The efficiency of the
financial markets, Macey argued, has increased "as technology
had developed and as market professionals who compete to find
mispriced securities have emerged in huge numbers." Moreo\"er,
"the opportunities for manipulation and fraud are probably fewer
now than at any time in history" and "rules against fraud existed
long before there was an SEC." Finally, the development of
portfolio theory and capital asset pricing models had eliminated
diversifiable risks from the investment process. Macey's conclusion: "Market forces and exogenous technological changes .. .
have obviated any public interest justification for the SEC that may
have existed."
Macey's argument was a non-starter then . The conventional
wisdom held that "the SEC is one important reason why the
securities industry is in so much better shape than other financial
service industries, and why U.S. securities markets are the
best securities markets in the world." The causal connection
between the existence of the SEC and the strength of the U.S .
capital markets was difficult to pinpoint, but the conventional
wisdom did not question its existence. And that conventional

wisdom concerning the essential role of the SEC in protecting
the integrity of the financial markets has only been strengthened
by the aforementioned accounting scandals although the certainty
that the U.S. markets are the best in the world may have been
shaken a bit .
Am I simply tilting at the same windmills as Macey? I think
not. Whereas Macey seemed intent on affirmatively killing off the
SEC and its essential functions, my proposal is (I think), considerably more modest . To return to the metaphor of my title, I think
retirement would suffice; capital punishment of the kind proposed
by Macey is a bit extreme . By retirement, I mean the abolition of
the SEC and the transfer of its essential functions to the executi\"e
branch . Specifically, I propose transferring the SEC's regulatory function to the Treasury Department and its enforcement
function to the Justice Department, while leaving largely intact
the enforcement functions of the state securities authorities and
the self-regulatory organizations such as the National Association
of Securities Dealers (NASO), the New York Stock Exchange
(NYSE), and the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board
(PCAOB) .
Old wine in new bottles? Again, I think not. Separating the
SEC's regulatory function from its enforcement function promises
to improve the effecth·eness and efficiency of both. My main
point goes to accountability. Although it is traditionally argued
that placing administrative responsibilities within the executive
branch rather than an independent agency is desirable because
it increases accountability, I think that the shift of authority I
propose might diminish accountability, at least of a certain sort.
The accountability that I believe should be diminished is the SEC's
accountability to Congress. Because the SEC is an "independent"
agency, the President's influence over the agency is limited to the
ability to nominate commissioners, and even that power is subject
to the Senate's confirmation authoritv.
, The SEC's status as an
"independent" agency leaves it vulnerable to the political whims
of key legislators. That vulnerability fuels the cyclical pattern
of neglect and hysterical overreaction that typifies securities
regulation emanating from both the SEC and Congress. Moving
securities regulation to the executive branch might help insulate
the field from this destructive pattern . In addition, congressional
oversight does little to help overcome the SEC's susceptibility
to groupthink and confirmation bias. Moreover, moving securiLQN Summer 2005
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ties regulation to the executive branch might open up the field to
more diverse perspectives. More executive branch involvement
might also encourage securities regulators to move beyond their
fixation with promulgating new disclosure requirements. Finally,
disrupting the close connection between the SEC and Congress
might disrupt
at the margin
the disproportionate influence
that interest groups exert over securities regulation. I should
begin with a caution: I do not mean to overstate my case. The SEC
should certainly not be singled out as an underperformer among
regulatory agencies. It enjoys the reputation as being one of the
more competent of the administrative agencies and that reputation is, in my view, largely warranted. My point is a more modest
one: Institutions matter in regulatory policy. In the field of securities regulation at least, the investing public is not well served
by vesting authority in an independent agency. I do not believe
that securities regulation in the United States has been a failure,
but that does not mean that we are incapable of doing better. We
might do better by placing the responsibility for the development
of securities regulation and the enforcement of those rules in the
executive branch.
Where has the SEC fallen short?The list should be a familiar
one for most observers of securities law; I do not offer it as
original. Nor is it intended to be comprehensive; others will have
their own favorite examples of SEC failure. My purpose here is
merely to show that the SEC's interaction with Congress plays an
important role in explaining a range of familiar shortcomings.
Reg1u1l11t fo!l'y l(])veirread iolll

The single most powerful influence on regulatory policy is
the urge to protect defrauded investors in the wake of the bull
market. To be sure, some investors are defrauded as a bull market
is climbing ever higher, but the rising tide tends to obscure the
shenanigans as everyone focuses on the profits that they are piling
up on paper. Congressmen (at least some of them) recognize in
the abstract that encouraging liquid securities markets will facili tate capital formation, and thus, economic growth. Regulation
may be necessary to secure that liquidity. That interest, however,
is not high on the list of legislative priorities during bull markets
when investors' primary focus is counting their gains and chasing
the next "sure thing." During these periods, Congress is happy to
leave the day-to-day regulating to the SEC, which is, after all, the
expert agency.
Bear markets, however, inevitably follow bull markets.
Corporate mismanagement and corruption can be obscured by
rising stock prices in a bull market, but the dirty laundry has
a way of surfacing in bear markets. The bad news flushes out
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dissatisfied investors who clamor for government intervention.
Politicians who happily ignored ever-climbin~ stock markets
become profoundly interested in disclosure policy when the
financial news migrates from the business page of the newspaper
to the front page. The accounting scandal du jour provides an
opportunity to fulminate, hold a series of show trials called
"legislative hearings" to rake some greedy businessmen over the
coals, and then enact legislation to protect "investor confidence."
Indeed, that is the genesis of the Exchange Act, which garnered
much of its legislative momentum from the legislative proceedings orchestrated by Franklin Roosevelt's henchman, Ferdinand
Pecora. The recent spectacle of politicians falling all over themselves to outdo each other in "getting tough on corporate crime"
is only the latest chapter of political overreaction to the fallout
of corruption revealed by a bear market. How quickly the winds
shifted in Washington when Enron and WorldCom collapsed
under the weight of their "creative" accounting. Congress and
the SEC, previously inert, have responded to public outrage over
corporate shenanigans by proposing a laundry list of new laws
and regulations to crack down on corporate abuses. For example,
after stymieing regulation of auditor independence during the bull
market, Congress quickly shifted course on the question with the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act imposing an array of restrictions on services
by accounting firms to their auditor clients.
There may be more than political opportunism at work here.
The availability heuristic is also in play, as both the SEC and
Congress focus too narrowly on recent and immediately available
information. Regulators may also be too quick to see a pattern in
a series of events that are in fact random. For example, a handful
of salient accounting scandals may be construed as a corporate
governance crisis. In the face of a crisis, regulatory approaches
seem to make sense when they previously had no support whatsoever. Immediately prior to the Enron scandal, CEO certification of financial statements was nowhere to be found on the SEC
list of policy initiatives. It was hardly news that CE Os sometimes
fudge the numbers, occasionally on a grand scale. Nonetheless,
CEO certification - like other aspects of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
- would not have been adopted without the external pressure
to react to a supposed crisis. Similarly, before the Enron scandal
broke, Capitol Hill had no interest in safeguarding the role that
analysts play as gatekeepers in the securities markets. After the
scandal, legislators were baying for regulatory reform, some of
them - perhaps - even sincerely. It seems unlikely that this shift
on the part of lawmakers could represent a rational response to
new information. More likely, it is a symptom of the availability
heuristic at work. Also at work is the hindsight bias, as SEC regulators and their congressional overlords place too much weight
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on the probability of past events that actually occurred relative
to those that did not. Enron was "obviously" a disaster waiting
to happen - how odd that so few recognized it before disaster
struck.
And of course these biases interact in perverse ways with
the aforementioned political imperative to respond to the latest
headlines. Opportunistic politicians may take advantage of the
biases of the electorate, playing up recent instances of fraud
to gain electoral support . Analyst independence only became
a priority when the New York state attorney general revealed
incriminating internal e-mails from Merrill Lynch. Only after
Enron and WorldCom moved accounting from the business
page to the front page was auditor independence a compelling need . The SEC did nothing to discourage the notion that
the small numb<,r of companies implicated in these scandals
reflected a broader pattern, a statistically very dubious proposition (following the "law" of small numbers). Notwithstanding
this dubious empirical foundation, once this story took hold
alternative explanations were pushed aside. Just as curious as
the (over) -reaction to the "analyst affair" was the lack of reform
effort prior to the scandal. The airing of the investment bank's
dirty laundry provided no new information on the conflicts of
interest that plague that business model. The SEC - and indeed,
most investors - have long known that analyst ratings are skewed
toward optimism and that auditors often provide non-auditing
services to their clients.
Worse yet, some of the abuses that Congress has lately seen
fit to regulate can be traced back, not to a lack of regulation, but
rather, laxity in enforcement. During the bull market, Congress
had more important uses for the taxes generated from securities transactions than policing the securities markets. An understaffed Securities and Exchange Commission long ago gave up
periodic review of company filings because it had other priorities.
Accounting fraud ranked low on the enforcement agenda, trailing
the vendetta against insider traders and the pursuit of teenagers
engaged in Internet stock scams. Only in the late 1990s did the
SEC make financial reporting a priority. Once financials were put
under the microscope, the agency claimed itself to be shocked
to find that chief financial officers were playing fast and loose
with the numbers. Once the SEC started looking at the books,
the number of restatements skyrocketed and we had a "deluge of
restatements" on our hands (at least in the light of the particularly
salient accounting scandals making the front pages).
The "deluge" now seems to have abated somewhat, but the
passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act has been followed up by an
orgy of rulemaking that shows no signs of subsiding anytime
soon. The SEC, seeing a window of opportunity, looks for areas

in which to expand its sphere of influence while the public still
worries over the specter of massive fraud . The n;gulation of hedge
funds looks to be the next territory to conquer.
Congress, however, shows certain signs of restlessness. As the
echoes of those accounting shenanigans begin to fade, various
members of Congress have been making threatening noises on
the question of the proper accounting treatment of options. The
loss to public corporations of beefed-up internal controls is called
into question. Scandal-driven reform followed by political neglect
has been a recurring pattern in the securities markets . Although
scandals may be needed to focus dispersed lawmakers' collective will, they often result in overreaction, particularly if political
entrepreneurs succeed in framing the issue in a way that resonates
with the electorate.
That dynamic means that demands for financial market regulation will arise in times of crisis, particularly if that crisis spills
over into the real economy. Crisis, however, does not create the
ideal environment for developing balanced, cost-effective policy
interventions. Politicians will want to "do something," even if
the proposed something may prove to be costly, ineffective, or
counterproductive. SEC Commissioners and division heads will
be called to the carpet by legislators looking to hold someone
accountable for the market decline. Commissioners and staffers
tend not to enjoy such encounters. Not being paid very well
(relative to their alternative employment opportunities), they
expect to at least lead a quiet life, which leads them to a strong
preference for conservatism in regulation . From the bureaucrat's
perspective, the optimal number of regulatory failures is zero.
If a rule makes an incremental contribution to the avoidance of
a future crisis, government regulators may be quick to see the
rule's wisdom, discounting its costs. Those costs will be born
by investors generally, in the form of small reductions in their
investment returns and disclosure documents that bury important
information in a sea of minutia. Those costs are sufficiently diffuse
that they are unlikely to generate a groundswell for regulatory
reform. Thus, the cumulative effect of regulation in response to
crisis is a ratchet effect pushing toward greater, more intrusive
regulation and greater dead-weight costs for investors.
It may take multiple crises to push government regulations
to the point where they become a serious drag on the financial
markets, but having reached that point, it becomes very difficult
to turn the ship of state toward less regulation. Staffers at the SEC
have more important tasks to worry about than figuring out which
regulations can be discarded - when is the last time anyone at
the SEC sat down looking for items to cut from Regulation S-K?
Do investors in today's environment really need a discussion of
the impact of inflation on a company's operations?
LQN Summer 2005
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Worse yet, once in place, legislation and regulations often take
on a life of their own . It took Congress over six decades to get
around to repealing the Glass-Steagall Act, for example, enacted
in response to the crisis of the Great Depression. Legislators may
accept the wisdom of prior legislation uncritically, operating
under a confirmation bias. Interest groups that benefit from the
regulatory apparatus will fight hard to preserve their prerogatives.
Deregulation requires a mammoth (and unusual) mustering of
political will. Without any recent information of equal salience
- nonscandals tend not to generate newspaper headlines - no
impetus will develop to remove the protective legislation .
One could argue that this regulatory approach makes sense
put out fires and "don't fix what ain't broke." It may be costly
to experiment with new regulations (or less regulation) without
the threat of a perceived and immediate loss to investors. But
this generalization cannot always be true . Sometimes rationalizing regulation, such as loosening up restrictions on forwardlooking disclosure, may benefit both issuers and investors. The
continued bias toward reactive reform to the securities laws
represents a very dubious presumption in favor of the status quo.
That presumption can only be O\·ercome, it seems, by a spate
of headlines. This political cycling between policies of benign
neglect and hysterical overreaction suggests that the SEC, far from
serving as a shelter against the vagaries of the political winds, acts
more like a weathervane, swinging wildly with the change in the
political atmosphere .
16

Gro1U1.ptll-n.inlk" anJ icm1firn:na t iion lbiias

I turn now from the SEC's susceptibility to external stimuli
to its internal thought processes. Few obseners would suggest
that there is a great deal of diversity of thought at the SEC. The
SEC is known for its strong organizational culture. Often praised
as hard-working and dedicated, the mission of"investor protection" is taken to heart by virtually all SEC staffers. As former SEC
Chairman Arthur Levitt put it: "Investor protection is our legal
mandate. Investor protection is our moral responsibility. Investor
protection is my top personal priority." This ethos is no doubt
reinforced by self-selection among those seeking SEC employment . The people who pursue careers as regulators and enforcement officials may be individuals with heightened senses of justice
and fairness . This is not entirely a bad thing. Such traits may lead
regulators to work hard for relatively low pay. Such a culture
helps maintain morale and focuses SEC staffers on the task of
regulating the capital markets.
Despite these benefits, the strong investor protection culture
within the SEC may also lead to "groupthink." Groupthink occurs
when individuals come to identify with the organization and
58
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accept its mission uncritically due to their perceived membership in the group. Although an individual mar, assess a particular
decision critically, members of a group defer to the consensus .
Groupthink will also tend to reduce the range of hypotheses
that an organization considers when faced with a problem.
Homogeneous groups like the self-selected SEC staffers are
particularly susceptible to the confirmation bias and are perhaps
more likely to engage in self-serving inferences (to the extent that
all the staffers have a homogeneous interest). Once the SEC has
committed to a policy initiative through a rulemaking proposal
- thereby tentatively committing to the "group" - feedback on
the proposal may get less weight than it would have if the information had been solicited before the SEC fixated upon a specific
proposal.
Groupthink may also manifest itself in the SEC's single-minded
focus on investor protection . When a decision can be placed on a
normative scale, such as more or less investor protection, group
decision dynamics will push the group toward a polar end of the
scale. At the SEC, the systematic tendency will be to settle on
outcomes that promise more investor protection. Many investors
may be able to protect themselves, but the SEC usually focuses
on the stereotypical "widows and orphans" in crafting protections.
The SEC's recent initiative to regulate hedge funds, the investment haven of the ultra-rich, springs to mind. If hedge funds
are not safe for widows and orphans, the SEC must bring them
to heel. Only political pressure is likely to deter the SEC from
seeking the most restrictive alternative.
The SEC's focus on "widows and orphans" also helps explain
its consistently siding with the plaintiffs' bar. The plaintiffs' bar, of
course, styles itself as the "investors' advocate" even more strongly
than does the SEC. Private class-action litigation has been an
important impetus tmvard ever more expansive interpretations
of the anti-fraud rules. With a few minor exceptions (sometimes
dri ven by fear of congressional retribution), the SEC has sided
with the plaintiffs' bar in the courts. As a somewhat exasperated Justice Powell noted, the "SEC usually favors all Jt. I can't
recall a case in which this was not so."The SEC has promoted
this expansion despite the readily apparent weaknesses in the
arguments for investor compensation .
Congress is of two minds on this issue. Legislators are opposed
to "frfrolous litigation," but they strongly favor compensating their
constituents for corporate fraud, even going so far as to give up
some money that would otherwise go the U.S . Treasury. Being
of two minds is the profit maximizing strategy for members of
Congress, as it allows them to extract contributions from the
deep pockets on both sides of the issue.
The SEC's single -minded focus on im-estor protection may
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also fuel its aversion to clear rules. Regulated entities and their

with measures invariably derived from some variant of disclosure.

lawyers vastly prefer determinate rules, which allow them
to structure their business dealings in predictable ways. The

Bribes being paid to foreign government officials? Disclose them!

SEC, however, likes to afford itself leeway, promulgating mind-

ally has been justified as a means of exposing potentially prob-

numbingly detailed and correspondingly impenetrable rules, but
preserving discretion to pursue those who would manipulate

"sunlight .. . is the best disinfectant" provides a succinct summary

those rules for some deceptive purpose. Too much clarity in the

CEOs being paid obscene sums? Disclose it! Disclosure traditionlematic activities. Justice Louis Brandeis' oft-quoted phrase that

rules is deemed to provide a "roadmap to fraud." And, of course,

of the philosophy behind disclosure. Once investors (and others)
can see such activities clearly, then market participants are less

the SEC has a very expansive notion of what constitutes fraud,
one seldom bounded by common law understandings of the term .

likely to engage in opportunistic behavior in the first place.
Managers considering a self-dealing transaction, for example,

Those regulated may find the outer limits of the rules only when

may choose not to do so if related -party transactions must be

they are facing an enforcement action and the SEC is demanding

disclosed . In addition to ferreting out agency costs, disclosure

a settlement. Congress is responsible for the broad rulemaking

may assist rational investors in allocating their investment dollars,

delegations that have facilitated this aversion to clear rules and it

leading to better use of capital and more accurate securities
prices. So disclosure has much to recommend it as a policy lever

has done nothing to rein in the SEC's open-ended interpretations
of statutes.
Does congressional oversight ameliorate this tendency toward
the groupthink of"investor protection"? Not likely; instead,

in securities regulation .
But disclosure is far from a panacea. qounded search at the

congressional review tends to push the SEC to skew delibera-

SEC may blind regulators to possible alternatives to disclosure
regulation. In the wake of the Enron and WorldCom scandals,

tion over rule proposals to make those rules easier to justify
to committee chairs and their staffs. If rules are proposed to

the SEC proposed requiring corporate chief executive officers
to certify corporate financial statements annually. Congress,

satisfy political demands, legislative oversight will induce greater

anxious to be seen "doing something," followed this proposal with

justification for those rules, but it is unlikely to generate more

legislation enacting the CEO certification requirement into law.
What this added to the existing disclosure received by investors

thoughtful consideration on the part of regulators. Because the
SEC staff will be aware of the preferences of important members
of congressional committees, the staff will tailor regulatory rules
to conform to those preferences.

is unclear, but the in terrorem threat posed to CEOs and CFOs is
quite clear. Huge sums are now being devoted to ensuring that
this "disclosure" is accurate. If it is not, the execufr· s fear, a flurry
0

The confirmation bias can be seen in the path dependence in

of lawsuits will follow, for which they face very real exposure to

the SEC's regulations. As originally enacted in the 1933 and 1934
Acts, the securities laws provided separate disclosure standards

personal liability (or, a more remote prospect, an SEC enforce-

for companies making public offerings and those whose securities simply trade on the secondary markets. For several decades
thereafter, commentators recognized the need to unify disclo-

ment action or, still more remote, criminal prosecution). Simply
having adequate disclosures is no longer enough ; company executives need to disclose about disclosure. And the informational
value to investors of this certification has to be considered quite

sure standards. Disclosures have the same relevance to investors

dubious. Given these difficulties with disclosure as a regulatory

whether they are purchasing in a public offering or on the

tool, the SEC's continued reliance on disclosure suggests an

secondary market. The SEC did not seriously consider revamping

unduly narrow search within the SEC.
Disclosure is the tool of choice largely because that is what

the scheme until the 1960s, ultimately adopting the present
integrated disclosure system. Even that, however, falls short of a
full -fledged scheme of company disclosure . Congress is nowhere

Congress has given the SEC. The SEC's regulatory strategy reflects

to be found on this issue . Redundant disclosure is imposing a

the broad grants of authority to the agency to mandate corporate
disclosures under the 1933 and 1934 Acts. Alternatives to disclo -

small but steady drag on the economy, but there is no political hay
to be made in reducing that drag. And it certainly does not rise to

sure generally would require the SEC to seek statutory authorization from Congress. To get that authority, however, would almost

the level of a scandal.

certainly require the SEC to make an empirical showing to justify

F ixatil(])Jn with Jisdosure

the need for a new regulatory tool. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act
provides the SEC with a handful of additional tools, but disclosure

The SEC is not known for regulatory creativity, often
attempting to tackle difficult problems of corporate governance

remains the central theme. Even though it relies on disclosure
as the cure-all for the maladies of securities markets, the SEC
LQN Summer 2005
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has done surprisingly little to investigate the impact that disclosure has on those markets. The agency instead prefers to remain
above the grubbiness of empirical data, preferring to ground its
policy prescriptions in "investor confidence."The SEC avoids any
meaningful definition of investor confidence, thereby avoiding the
possibility of empirical contradiction. But it also avoids making a
persuasive case to Congress for more creative tools to use against
corporate malfeasance. Congress is unlikely to be creative in this
arena on its own, given its generally reactive approach to securities regulation.

Regulafory <C&ll}tmre
Why do Congress and the SEC lay such heavy burdens on
disclosure as the regulatory workhorse?The answer to that
question takes us to our last shortcoming, regulatory capture.
The SEC tirelessly promotes the myth that individual investors
can be successful in choosing their own stocks, if only they devote
sufficient energy to the voluminous disclosures made available to
them as a result of the wise regulations promulgated by the SEC.
Congress happily endorses the populist notion that every Joe or
Jane Investor can compete with the big boys in picking stocks.
Call it the myth of investor autonomy. Moreover, well informed
shareholders will hold directors to account, and those directors
will in turn keep greedy managers in check . Call this one the
myth of investor sovereignty. The empirical evidence contradicting
both of these notions is overwhelming.
Why do Congress and the SEC perpetuate these myths?
Because the financial services industry requires these myths for its
very existence . If investors were to switch en masse to index funds
and other forms of passive investment, the Wall Street-industrial complex would crumble. The SEC would lose its reason for
being. And members of Congress fortunate enough to serve on
the Senate Banking Committee and the House Financial Services
Committee would lose the steady stream of contributions that
help them maintain their tenure in office . So the myths of investor
autonomy and investor sovereignty must be maintained.
It would be a mistake to overstate the regulatory capture
story. Industry players fare well in the battle over the content of
securities regulation when they are enjoying the frothy rise of a
bull market. They are no match, however, for the populist appeal
of protecting defrauded small investors during a bear market,
as discussed above. Overall, there is little evidence to show that
the SEC's status as an independent agency has freed it from the
influence of industry capture. As an agency with a specialized
mission, it should come as no surprise that the subjects of that
regulatory attention have an interest in influencing the agency.
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This would come as no surprise to the Congress that created
the SEC - enhancing the susceptibility of t~e regulators to
capture was an important goal behind the creation of the SEC.
Enforcement of the securities law was originally entrusted to
the Federal Trade Commission, which proved less vulnerable to
the influence of the securities industry than the broker-dealer
community desired. The SEC was created as part of the' 34 Act as
a more industry specific regulator that would be more amenable
to the financial services industry.
Although that wish may have frustrated in the short run, in
the long run, the narrower focus of the SEC relative to the FTC
has made it more vulnerable to capture. The securities industry
has spent considerable lobbying resources to influence the
appointment of commissioners and, of even greater significance,
chairmen. Moreover, the financial services industry has considerable influence over the information that the SEC receives as it
undertakes its rulemaking responsibilities. The result has been a
system of securities regulation that largely benefits the big players
in the securities industry. The SE C's protection of fixed commis sions in the brokerage industry from the debilitating effects of
competition for nearly half a century is by now a hackneyed
example. And the SEC has dragged its heels in implementing the
National Market System that Congress intended to replace the old
cartel system. The agency continues to struggle to find a place for
proprietary trading systems as the NYSE and NASDAQ resist this
incursion into their comfortable sinecures. It has also been argued
that other aspects of the SE C's regulatory agenda benefit primarily
the brokerage industry, including much of the detailed disclosure
required of public companies, as well as the contours of insider
trading law.
Industry influence has been reinforced by the narrow focus
of the relevant oversight committees in Congress, the Senate
Banking Committee and the House Financial Services Committee.
As Elena Kagan explains, "When Congress acts in [the sphere
of administration], it does so through committees and subcommittees highly unrepresentative of the larger institution (let
alone the nation) and significantly associated with particularized
interests." As of the writing of this article, 9 of the 51 members
of the House subcommittee for securities came from New York
New Jersey or Connecticut, and 3 out of the 15 members of th:
Senate Subcommittee came from these same three states. This
concentration of legislators from the New York metropolitan area
is evidence of the fact that "the one thing the shadow executive
system of the congressional standing committees can guarantee
us is that the most affected regional interests will try to kidnap
the federal law execution processes that most affect them ."The
remaining legislators on these subcommittees, coming from states
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lacking in constituents directly interested in this sector of the

imposed by the SROs could be handed over to the district courts.

economy, may be less acutely interested in the welfare ofWall
Street. Nonetheless, ser vice on one of these subcommittees is

The states could continue to play a role in enfor<ring the federal

a cash cow for these legislators, guaranteed to produce a steady
stream of campaign contributions. Wall Street makes huge invest-

statutes and regulations devised by Treasury.
Note that I am not suggesting firing the SEC staff -

the staff

members could be divvied up appropriately between the two

ments in influencing the contours of its regulatory environment.

departments without creating undue confusion. Five commis-

The financial services industry is not the only affected party
that gives special attention to these legislative oversight commit-

sioners, however, would be looking for work. I address below the
justifications for the minor blip in unemployment caused by this

tees. The accounting firms and the high-tech sector are also

sweeping transfer of regulatory authority.

intensely interested. This influence was felt during the 1990s on
the questions of expensing stock options and auditor independence; the SEC backed down in both cases in the face of congressional opposition . For example, corporations poured millions
of dollars into the campaign war chests of strategically placed
congressmen to head off the Financial Accounting Standards

Regullatory overreaictiioni
Could transferring regulatory authority to the executive
branch dampen the rapid swings from regulatory inertia to
regulatory hysteria? We have witnessed a series of largely gardenvariety frauds over the past few years. Companies were making

Board's efforts to require that options grants be accounted for as

up earnings. Analysts were recommending stocks that they

an expense. Congress then bullied the supposedly independent

thought were crap. Mutual funds were providing sweetheart deals

FASB into submission; the SEC aided and abetted the effort.
The consequences of this interested oversight is that the SEC
regulates in the shadow of potential retaliation from Congress.
Legislators on the relevant committees ha,·e powerful tools to
bring the agency to heel. If the agency strays too far from the
dominant view on those subcommittees, it risks legislative overruling and worse yet, budget cuts. The bottom line: "Independent"
agencies such as the SEC arc not independent of politics; they

to big investors in the form of guaranteed profits through late
trading. The response of the SEC and Congress to the revelation that "There is fraud in our financial markets!" has been a
deluge of new statutes and regulations. Those subject to all these
new rules publicly welcome them and privately pass the costs
along to investors. To be sure, some of the wrongdoers are now
facing enforcement actions and criminal prosecution. And the
companies, broker-dealers and mutual funds implicated in the

are highly dependent upon the industries that they are charged

sleaze have taken a serious hit in the market, which enforces its

with regulating. That dependency is mediated through Congress,
which uses its mediating role to extract financial support from the

judgments much more swiftly and surely than the government

financial services industry, accounting firms and public companies.

stock price of their employers is never enough . We must punish

Good work if you can get it.

the wrongdoers and make sure this never happens again. I have

ever could. But sending the bad guys to jail and hammering the

no quarrel with punishing the wrongdoers, but I fear that the

Tllire rexreicutn Y•e 1bn·anich as se,curitires rregullato r
My proposal is quite simple. The SEC's rulemaking authority
should be turned over to the Treasury Department, to be overseen

SEC and Congress will typically be fighting the last war as they
continually expand the Code of Federal Regulations and the
United States Code in their quest to end fraud. The fraudsters,

by the same regulators who oversee other aspects of financial

I'm afraid, will always be with us.

regulation . The SEC's enforcement authority should be turned

Would transferring accountability from the SEC to the
executive branch help matters? Accountability (or the lack

over to the Justice Department and combined with that agency's
existing fraud section. Civil and criminal enforcement would be
consolidated within the same department.

thereof) favors the status quo in this context. Although the
President remains ultimately accountable for policy choices

The adjudications currently processed by the SEC's administra-

affecting the securities markets in my model, the transfer of
authority envisioned in my proposal would divide accountability

tive law judges (ALJs) could be turned over to ALJs located in
Treasury, or better still, be conducted in federal district court.

between the Departments ofTreasury and Justice. Unlike the
commissioners of the SEC, who are responsible for both rule-

The SEC's supervisory authority over the SROs would also go to

making and enforcement, the Secretary of the Treasury and the

Treasury; SROs that failed to fulfill their enforcement obligations
could be referred to Justice. The SEC's power to review sanctions

Attorney General would each exercise only a portion of the

A few administrative details would need to be worked out.

regulatory authority currently wielded by the SEC. Unlike the
ultimate accountability borne by the President, these political
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actors would be accountable only for the regulatory authority
within their respective jurisdictions. This means that each will be
pointing the finger at the other in the event of regulatory "failure."
Was the scandal of the week the result of insufficiently stringent
rules or a consequence of lax enforcement?
One does not ordinarily consider finger-pointing of this sort
a useful mechanism for encouraging effective regulation. In this
context, however, separating enforcement and rulemaking allows
for a healthy bit of indirection and delay. The SEC has no one else
to blame when it is dragged before Congress - Congress has
certainly not been grudging in affording it rulemaking authority,
even if it frequently has been rather tight-fisted with dollars for
enforcement. But Justice and Treasury could blame each other.
"The rules prohibiting this fraud are unclear, so we can't go
after the bad guys" can be met by "This behavior clearly violates
our anti-fraud rules. Prosecutors should come down hard on
these fraudsters."This is the sort of mutual recrimination that
Washington uses all the time to deflect calls for change. It is
sometimes disparagingly characterized as "gridlock," but it has an
important stabilizing influence, unless one thinks that every social
ill calls out for a vigorous government response. The President
would be accountable for the trade-off between rulemaking and
enforcement. Congress is likely to think twice before it calls him
before a subcommittee for a lecturing on regulatory priorities and
the critical need to protect widows and orphans. Simply put, the
President is too busy for that . By contrast, commissioners of the
SEC, most assuredly, are not.
If Congress wanted to make its influence felt, it would have
to go through the tedious and time-consuming process of
drafting legislation, finding a majority coalition to vote for it, and
persuading the President to sign the resulting bill into law. The
marginal cost of this effort is substantially greater than bullying
the SEC. Perhaps Congress, too, would then find better things to
do.

Taslk diversity and jp><ersl)l>edive J.iversi t y
The Secretary of the Treasury has a lot of irons in the fire.
According to the department's Website, "The mission of the
Department of the Treasury is to promote the conditions for
prosperity and stability in the United States and encourage prosperity and stability in the rest of the world ."That's a big job. More
concretely, the Treasury is responsible for:
• Managing federal finances;
• Collecting taxes, duties and monies paid to and due to the
United States and paying all bills of the United States;
• Producing postage stamps, currency and coinage;
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• Managing government accounts and the public debt;
• Supervising national banks and thrift institutions;
• Advising on domestic and international' financial, monetary,
economic, trade, and tax policy;
• Enforcing federal finance and tax laws;
• Investigating and prosecuting tax evaders, counterfeiters,
and forgers .
This diversity of tasks encourages a diversity of perspectives among the top officials at the Treasury. Although all of the
senior staff are likely to have expertise in one or more of these
areas, it is unlikely that any one of these areas will predominate.
Consequently, when it comes time to decide important policy
matters, the Secretary will be getting advice from people with
a broad range of backgrounds. For the Secretary and the rest
of the Treasury staff, it is hard to have a single-minded focus on
saving widows and orphans from the vipers ofWall Street when
you have so many tasks that require your attention. Investor
protection would continue to be an important goal for a Treasury
Department charged with regulating the securities markets,
but so would capital formation, diversification of the outlets for
financial services to consumers, and cooperation with foreign
regulators.
To be sure, under my proposal, many members of the Treasury
staff will specialize in the regulation of the securities markets, but
their proposals will face the scrutiny of superiors not suffused
in the culture of investor protection. And promotion within the
department is unlikely to be a lock-step progression - a person
who shows talent in the field of banking or tax might be tapped
for an important role in regulating the securities markets. Going
higher up the chain, Republicans and Democrats would switch
places in the politically-appointed slots as power shifted in the
White House . The result would be less homogeneity, broader
search and more critical thinking generally.
So too, with the Justice Department. The Attorney General
has at least as broad a range of concerns as the Secretary of the
Treasury - locking up terrorists, fighting the war on drugs,
prosecuting environmental polluters, etc. Going down to the
trenches, the FBI special agent who shows talent in making a case
against Medicare fraudsters may well have talent for unraveling
the machinations of accounting fraudsters. Fraud is fraud, and
the expertise of the SEC staff can easily be oversold . The Justice
Department has many lawyers and investigators who are profi
cient at prosecuting securities fraud (e.g. , the fraud unit of the
U.S. Attorney's office in the Southern District of New York).
There would be many more such professionals if the Justice
Department took over civil enforcement of the securities laws
along with the criminal authority that it already exercises. But

THE SEC AT 70: TIME FOR RETIREMENT?

expertise must be balanced against diversity of perspective, and it
is hard to imagine any state of the world in which the SEC would
surpass Justice on diversity.
More importantly, the lawyers at Justice are more likely to
view the regulations promulgated by Treasury with a critical
eye. Although both departments are nominally components of
the executive branch, they have distinct histories and cultures.
Lawyers at Justice are much less likely to buy in to the work of
Treasury than SEC enforcement attorneys are to buy in to the
work of the Divisions of Market Regulation or Corporate Finance.
The lawyers in the executive branch are on the same side, but
not the same team . Justice is unlikely to suffer from confirmation
bias in reviewing the proposals ofTreasury; it is not their work,
after all . The division between the two departments also matters
for those discussions of enforcement policy in slightly shabby
conference rooms at Justice or the Treasury. Clear rules may be
a "roadmap to fraud," but it is much easier to show violations of
them in court. The skepticism with which the Solicitor General's
office has treated some of the SEC's more cockamamie theories
affords a concrete example.
Lawyers at the Justice Department are also more likely to
be skeptical of the need for class action litigation and investor
compensation . The SEC's support for the plaintiffs' bar helps
the agency with the more populist clement in Congress, but the
Justice Department knows that deterrence is really the critical
element in minimizing the social costs of fraud. Fraudsters need
to go to jail and pay hefty fines; what happens to the money
afterward is, at best, a sideshow.

F ixation ,viifh Jisd<0>1n.ue
Can a transfer of authority to the executive branch stimulate
more creative thinking about regulatory responses to malfeasance
by corporate officers and financial services professionals? Recall
my argument that the Congress and the SEC focus almost exclu sively on disclosure because it reinforces the myths of investor
autonomy and sovereignty, a very lucrative myth as far as the
financial services sector is concerned.
Would the Treasury and the President be equally enamored
of this myth of the empowered im·estor? To be sure, the financial
services industry is a major contributor to presidential as well as
congressional campaigns, so disclosure has continued appeal. But
the lines of accountability for ultimate policy choices would be
clarified somewhat with a transfer of authority to the executive
branch. A risk-averse President who wanted to avoid a political
backlash from the next bull market would strongly favor a well diversified electorate. The real stories of pain in a market decline
are from the poor souls who are under-diversified . Politicians, of

course, are notoriously wary of blaming even foolhardy victims
for their plight (think of the Enron employees), despite the inexpensive self-help that they could have adopted. "This all could have
been avoided with a bit more disclosure!" Or a bit of diversification. It is doubtful that a politician in the White House would
be willing to blame the victim any more than Congress and the
SEC. Policy will continue to focus on throwing the books at the
wrongdoers.
But will the President follow condemnation of the bad guys
with a slew of new disclosure requirements to address last year's
fraud?The President has the advantage of being able to rely on the
strong rhetorical message sent by actual criminal prosecutions.
The SEC 's civil enforcement powers look rather tame by comparison to hard time. Congress has only the ability to write additional
rules . Congress can, of course, ratchet the jail time up another
couple notches, but most maximum penalties in the securities
area arc already well past the point of diminishing marginal deterrence and, worse yet, obviously so. No one is impressed anymore
by another five to ten potential years of jail time for white-collar
criminals after the first ten to twenty. Martha Stewart's six
months in prison will be quite sufficient to deter her from lying
to the government in the future. Neither Congress nor the SEC
has the satisfying power of throwing the fraudsters in jail . Used
aggressively, the authority to prosecute could satiate the public
clamor to do something without imposing an additional burden of
disclosure costs on all the business that did not break the law and
should not be punished. This may not satisfy the hue and cry for
government intervention in extreme cases, but a few well-placed
"perp walks" can help deflect the demand for additional disclosure
requirements.

R e gulafoll'y capture
Would a transfer of authority to the executive branch make a
significant dent in the extent of regulatory capture? Of the four
concerns identified here, this one carries the least weight; it would
be insufficient standing alone to justify transferring regulatory
authority to the executive branch . The principal effect of such a
transfer on the usual pattern of"Inside -the -Beltway" rent seeking
would be to simply shift some of the power to extract rents
- regulated industries from members of Congress would have
a bit less, and the President would have a bit more . The financial
services industry already tries to curry favor with the President
in order to influence the choice of commissioners and to be able
to call upon the President's aid in the lawmaking process (either
to instigate, or veto, legislation). Giving the President authority
over rulemaking would enhance the President's attractiveness as
recipient of lobbying largesse. By contrast, lobbying to influence
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the Justice Department's enforcement agenda would be very
tricky business; not many White House staffers would enjoy
waking up to read in the Washington Post about influence peddling
related to Justice Department fraud prosecutions. On balance,
I think the overall shift would be to make members of Congress
less attractive and the President more attractive, but rent seeking,
like fraud, will always be with us .
Despite these caveats, I think that my proposal would achieve
some limited success in diffusing the effect of lobbying expenditures. Members of the House and Senate subcommittees for
securities that do not have a substantial number of constituents in
the financial services industry have little to constrain them from
offering their votes and influence to the highest interested bidder.
The voters back home in Wyoming will have little interest in
their representative's vote on reforming the market structure for
buying and selling securities. In that vacuum of electoral interest,
campaign contributions (which can be used to pay for the television ads to reach all those voters spread so thinly across the state)
can be very persuasive indeed .
The President, by contrast, has many constituencies to which
he must answer and is unlikely to be able to give decisive weight
to any one interest group. Simply put, it costs more to buy a
President than a legislator, even a well-placed one . Moreover,
it is harder for lobbyists to gain access to the President, given
the demands on his time. To be sure, the White House staff and
Treasury Department officials are likely to be more responsive,
but they too will have diverse constituencies to which they need
to attend on the President's behalf. Congressional committee
members will still have a role to play in influencing policy, but
they carry substantially less of a threat in a conflict with the
executive branch than they do with the SEC. The President, as a
roughly co-equal actor in the legislative and budgetary processes,
can fight back if a department's budget is threatened; the SEC has
to grin and take it. A transfer to the executive branch will not
eliminate concerns over regulatory capture, but it might slow
down by a step or two the interest groups attempting to capture
regulatory policy.
More importantly, the accountability for tailoring regulation
to suit interest groups would be clear. Under the current regime,
Congress can bully the SEC into caving in when faced with
interest group pressure and no member of Congress will face any
serious threat ofreprisal (as with Congress' derailing of expensing
for options) . There is safety in numbers. If the President overrules
rules proposed by the Treasury staff, the responsibility will be
clear. If new rules are warranted, the President who nixes them
would face a considerably more substantial risk of political embarrassment than would an individual congressman.
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Co111c hll.sion
As the SEC marks its 70th anniversary, tht1 survival of securities regulation, and the federal government's role in that regulation, are no longer in doubt (if they ever were) . Federal securities
regulation is here to stay; proposals to do away with it are unlikely
to garner much support anytime soon.
I have made a more modest proposal: transferring that
authority over securities regulation to the executive branch. The
main impetus behind my call for reform is that the SEC is "independent" in name only. The agency's dependence on Congress has
some unfortunate consequences for the path of regulatory policy
in the field of securities. Specifically, far from dampening the
boom and bust cycle in securities regulation, the SEC - under
the watchful eye of Congress - has fueled the cyclical swings in
regulatory policy as a means of gaining additional authority and
budgetary support. Congress and the SEC have fed off each institution's cognitive biases. Most destructively for investor welfare,
both institutions have perpetuated the twin myths of investor
autonomy and investor sovereignty. Finally, vesting regulatory
authority in the SEC has facilitated agency capture and enhanced
the ability of members of Congress to extract rents from the
securities industry, the accounting profession, and others affected
by securities regulation .
I have argued that the executive branch might be somewhat
less subject to these maladies if we were to vest authority over
securities regulation in the Treasury and Justice Departments. I
am far from claiming that regulatory "perfection" (whatever that
would mean) would follow ifmy proposal were implemented.
More modest improvements, however, might come about.
Transferring authority might dampen the regulatory over-reaction
that follows in the wake of bear markets. The Treasury and Justice
Departments would almost certainly bring greater diversity of
perspective to addressing the problems of corporate governance
and the securities markets. Those departments might view more
skeptically the claim that disclosure solves everything. And my
proposal might reduce the extent of agency capture at the margin
(but only at the margin).
Is my proposal to transfer regulatory authority over the securities markets to the executive branch as far-fetched as Jonathan
Macey's call to end federal securities regulation altogether? It
might appear so at first blush. The SEC is busier than ever, better
funded than ever, and has more support generally in Congress
than it has enjoyed any time in recent memory. Moreover, there
are powerful constituencies that have come to rely on the SEC
for their professional livelihood. Corporate lawyers, for example,
would strenuously resist the abolition of the SEC. I am a natural
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born pessimist, so I freely concede that my proposal is unlikely to
be adopted anytime soon .
The one constant in securities regulation is that the political
fortunes of the SEC generally ebb and flow with the cycles of
the market . The correlation is inverse, however, so the SEC rides
high when the Dow Jones Industrial Average rides low. But within
that broader correlation there is some variance in the support for
the SEC. When the market is first hitting the downward trend
in its cycle, support for the SEC may dip along with the major
indices. In one of those future dips - who can predict when it
will come - may arise the opportunity for the sort of administrative reform proposed here. To be sure, the relevant committees
in Congress will cling tenaciously to their "independent" agency,
but sometimes the political imperative to "do something" can
overcome even entrenched institutional self-interest. It would be
a poor bet to try to handicap a retirement date for the SEC, but it
might be almost as speculati,·e to count on the agency's staying on
the job forever.

I
Prefessor

ef Law Adam C. Pritchard teaches corporate and securi -

ties law at the Law School. His current research focuses on the effects

effraud on securities markets and the role ef class action liti9ation in
controllin9fraud. His articles hm•e appeared in the Business Lawyer,

Virginia Law Re\'iew, Southern California Law Review, Stanford
Law Review, and the Journal of Finance. Prefessor Pritchard holds
B.A . and J.D. de9rees from the University efVir9inia, as well as an M .P.P.
from the Harris School

ef Public Policy at the University ef Chica90. ll'hile

at Vir9inia, he was an Olin Fellow in Law and Economics and served as
articles development editor on the Virginia Law Review . After 9radu-

ef the United States
efAppealsfor the Fourth Circuit and served as a Bristow Fellow in
the Office ef the Solicitor General at the U.S. Department efJustice . lifter
ation, he clerkedfor Jud9e J. Harvie Wilkinson Ill
Court

workin9 in private practice, Pritchard served as senior counsel in the Office

ef the General Counsel ef the SEC, where he wrote appellate briefs and
ef recent reforms in the areas ef securitiesfraud liti9a -

studied the effect

tion. He received the SEC's Law and Policy Awardfor his work in United
States v. O'Hagan, in which the Supreme Court upheld the misappro-

ef insider tradin9. Pritchard has been a visitin9 prefessor
at the Northwestern University School ef Law, the Geor9etown Uni1 ersity
Law Center, and the University ef Iowa School ef Law. He has also been a

priation theory

1

visitin9 scholar at the Securities and Exchan9e Commission, and a visitin9
fellow in capital market studies at the Cato Institute .

LQN Summer 2005

I

65

